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Analyses of gender differences in investments in  education more than agriculture does.  Parents
human capital typically emphasize farnily  form expectations about the sector their children
resources as the determining factor. These  are likely to work in as adults and choose levels;
studies usually find that investments in male  of schooling accordingly.)
offspring are greater, that these differences
narrow as the level of household wealth in-  *  As services' share in GDP increases com-
creases, and that equity is also affected by the  pared to agriculture (holding industry's share
composition of household wealth (proxied by the  constant), girls' demand for schooling increases
amount the mother earns and/or her educational  more than boys' demand for schooling.
level).
An increase in industry's share in GDP
Gill addresses one drawback of these analy-  relative to agriculture (holding services' share
ses:  they do not explicitly consider the factors  constant) is more closely associated with an
that  determine the demand for schooling and  increase in the demand for schooling of boys
health - other than tastes - and why this  than of girls.
differs for men and women. Gill uses the
regional structure of the economy, proxied by the  *  A decrease in the supply price of schooling
shares of services and industry in regional gross  increases the level of schooling attained by both
domestic product (GDP), as an indicator of the  sexes, but the gain is larger for women.
demand for educated workers. By examining
whetherie  level of schooling as a function of  *  Increases in wealtd,.  all else being eqZal, are
shares of services and industry differs for men  associated with increases in both sexes' dtnand
and women, he looks for gender bias in the  for schooling.
demand for schooling.  Gill estimates schooling
demand functions for males and females using  What are the policy implications of these
household data from the Peruvian Living Stan-  findings?  Some ways to increase educational
dards Survey, and provincial data from the  levels, especially those of women, include (on
Peruvian census.  the supply side) lowering the supply price of
schooling - improving access to secondary
Gill's primary findings are:  scniooling,  for example - and (on the demand
side) expanding the services sector.  The
As services and industry increase as a share  demand- side prescription contradicts the World
of GDP, relative to agriculture's share, the  Bank and IMF policy advice that developing
demand for schooling increases for both boys  countries foster the growth of tradables to service
and girls.  (Both industry and services reward  their extemal debt.
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typically  emphasize  family  resources  as the  determining  factor.  (See  Schultz
and  Rosenzweig  (1982),  Gertler  and  Alderman  (1989)  for  investment  mn  health,
and  King and  Bellew  (1989)  for  investment  in  schooling.)  These  studies
approach  the  problem  as one  of investment  by parents  in the  human capital  of
male and female  children.  These  studies  usually  find  that  investments  in
male offspring  are  greater,  that  these  differences  narrow  as the level  of
household wealth increases, and that the composition  of household wealth
(proxied  by either  the  amount  earned  by the  mother  and/or  her  education
level)  affects  equity  as  well.
There  are two  major  drawbacks  in these  analyses.  First,  the
empirical  segments  confound  the  effects  (a)  of a  gender  bias inherent  in the
utility  function  of parents,  (b)  of gender  differences  in market  returns  to
human  capital,  and (c)  of gender  differences  in  appropriability  of returns
to investments  by parents  in children.  This  paper  does  not  address  this
issue.  Second,  these  analyses  contaln  no explicit  consideration  of the
factors  determining  the  demand  for  schooling  and  health,  other  than tastes,
and  why this  differs  for  males  and  females.  It is the  second  shortcoming
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1that  this  paper  seeks  to rectify. 1
In this  paper  I  use the  regional  structure  of the  economy,  proxied
by the  shares  of services  and industry  in  regional  gross  domestic  product
(GDP),  as an indicator  of the  demand  for  educated  workers.  By examining
whether  the level  of schooling  as a function  of shares  of services  and
industry  differs  for  men and  women,  we can  detect  gende  bias in the  demand
for  schooling.
Based  on the theoretical  framework  developed  in Gill  and  Khandker
(1990),  I  estimate  schooling  demand  functions  for  males  and  females  using
data  for  Peru in the  1980s.  A separate  estimate  covers  households  and
provinces  (called  "departments'  in Peru).  Household  data  are from  the
Peruvian  Living  Standards  Survey  (PLSS);  information  on the  provinces  is
based  on census  data.  Findings  confirm  the  results  obtained  in  Gill  and
Khandker  using  country-level  data for  about  100  countries  in 1965  and 1987.
The  primary  findings  are:
o  As services  and industry  increase  their  shares  of GDP,  relative  to
the  share  of agriculture,  the  demand  for  schooling  of  both males  and
females  increases.
O  As the  share  of services  in  GDP increases  compared  to agriculture
(holding  the share  of industry  constant),  the  demand  for  schooling  by
women  increases  more than  the  demand  for schooling  by men.
IIt  should  be mentioned  here that  the  absence  of explicit  consideration
of demand-side  factors  in the  market  for  labor  is a  weakness  of much of
neoclassical  labor  economics.
2o  An increase  in the  share  of industry  relative  to agriculture  (.  ding
the share  of services  constant),  is  more  closely  associated  with an
increase  in the  demand  for  schooling  of men than  of  women.
o  A decrease  in the  supply  price  of schooling  increases  the  level  of
schooling  attained  by both sexes,  but the  gain  is larger  for  women.
o  Increases  in  wealth,  ceteris  paribus,  are  associated  with increases  in
the  demand  of both sexes  for  schooling.
The plan  of the  paper  is  as follows:  Sectior.  z  introduces  the
basic theory.  A representative  family  is assumed  that  has an adult  couple
and  one female  and  one  male  child.  The issue  of fertility  is thus  entirely
sidestepped.  Parents  are  assumed  to  be the  decision-mnakers  regarding
investments  in  human  cap  .tal  of children.  They  do so  because  the  attained
utility  of their  chil..cen  matters  to them.  Attained  utility  depends  upon the
income  of children  as adults  and income  in turn  depends  upon the  human
capital  was invested  in them  by their  parents.  The demand  for  schooling  of
children  is focussed  upon.  Schooling  is  demanded  differentially  in different
sectors  of the  economy:  industry  and services  reward  education  more than
agriculture.2  Parents  form  expectations  about  the  sector  of the  economy
2Schultz  (1975)  argues  that  this  demand  for  education  reflects  the
higher  rates  of change  in industry.  Mincer  and  Higuchi  (1988)  and  Gill
(1989)  find  that sectoral  rates  of technical  change  in the  U.S. economy
between  1960-1985,  were related  positively  to the  rates  of return  to
education.  Welch (1970)  found  similar  relationships  in  U.S.  agriculture.
These  results  imply  that  the  rates  of return  to schooling,  and therefore  the
demand  for  educated  workers,  would  be highest  in industry  (especially
manufacturing),  lower  in trade  and  services,  and lowest  in  agriculture.
3that  their  children  are likely  to  work in as adults,  and choose  levels  of
schooling  for  each  child  accordingly.
In  the  basic  model,  parents  use their  own  time  allocation  as a
proxy  for  the  time-allocation  patterns  that  their  children  will  choose.  In
section  3 this  last  assumption  is amended.  Parents  forn  Apectations  of
time-use  of children  as adults  based  on both their  own  work experience  and
the  general  pattern  in the  region  of residence,  as  well as the  probability
of migration  to oth.'ar  regions.  Section  3  also discusses  the  implications  of
adding  sector-specific  work experience  (job  training)  as an  additional
component  of human  capital.
Section  4 uses  household  da.  a from  the  PLSS to test  the
implications  of the  theoretical  framework  developed  in sections  2 and 3.
The advantages  of using  household  data  are that  the  schooling  attainment  of
children  is directly  observed,  and the  effects  of  intrahousehold  factors  on
the  demand  for  schooling  of  boys and  girls  can  be accounted  for  by including
household  information  such  as the  education  and  occupation  of parents.
In  section  5, I test  the  implications  of the  theory  using
provincial  data  for  25 departments  in Peru  in the  1980s.  Illiteracy  rates
are  used  as a  proxy  for investment  in  schooling.  I  conduct  tests  to
ensure  that  department  illiteracy  rates  are  satisfactory  measures  of
department  schooling  attainment.  The findings  confirm  the  main implications
of the  theory,  and  add to the  evidence  from  household  analysis.
Section  6 discusses  the  policy  implications  of the  study.  The
policy  implications  are of two  types:  Supply-related  and demand-related.
4Supply-relaced  policy  preserLptions  are  those  targeted  towards  lowering
the  supply  price  of schooling,  such  as  improving  the  access  to secondary
schoolLng.  Dewarw-related  polLcLes  aim  at increasing  the  demand  for
education:  The  main policy  recommendation  entails  the  expansion  of the
servlces  sector.  This  contradicts  policy  advice  given  by the  World  Bank  and
the IMF  that  developing  countries  foster  the  growth  of tradables  to servLce
their  external  debt.  Another  policy  implicatlon  emphasizes  the  importance
of Lnformation  about  the  rates  of raturn  to schooling  ln the  market  and the
home sector.
52.  THE THEORETICAL  FRAMEWORK
Human  capital  is assumed  to consist  of two  components:  schooling
and  health. 3 Parents  value  only their  own .onsumptior  and the  attainable
utility  --  that  is,  the  full  income  --  of their  children  as adults.  ASF 
that  a couple  has only  one  female  and  one  male child.'  The  parents'  utility
function  is
U  - U  (C,R,R)  . (1)
where  C is the  quantity  of a general  consumption  good  consumed  by the
parents,  and  Rfand R  are  the "full"  incomes  of the  girl  and  b,;
respectively  when they  are  adults.
R  depends  on the  human  capital  of children.  Human  capita.  has
sev'eral  observable  components,  e.g.,  schooling,  health  and  job t_aLning.
I assume  here that  schooling  (S)  is the  only  form  of human  capital.  The
terms  human  capital  and  schooling  will  be used interchangeably  unless
otherwise  indicated.  Thus  the  returns  to  human  capital  functions  for  the
girl  and  the  boy  are
Rf  - Rf(Sf)  (2a)
R  R  (S  )  (2b)
3The  theoretical  framework  for  this  paper  departs  considerably  from
previous  theoretical  attempts  to analyze  gender  differences  in investments
in  human  capital,  such  as  Gertler  and  Ald rman's  (1989)  analysis  of
investments  in  health.
'The  issue  of fertility  is thus  sidestepped.  See  Becker  and  Tomes
(1976)  for  a theoretical  discussion  of fertility  and  quality-quantity
tradeoffs,  and Schafgans  (1990)  for  an empirical  treatment  using  Peruvian
data.
6The  budget  constraint  of the  household  is
Y  - C  +  Ps(St+S)  (3)
where  PF  represents  the  price  of schooling,  and  the  price  of the  consumrtion
good  has  been normalized  to equal  1.
There  are two  main sectors  of employment:  home and  the  market.
The rates  of return  to  human  capital  are  sector-specific.  Thus overall
returns  to schooling  depend  upon the  extent  to  which  time is  allotted
between  the  household  and the  market  (all  nonhousehold)  activities.
In this  paper  market  activities  are  subdivided  into  agriculture,  services
and  industry,  identified  as follows
o  - Household
1  - Agriculture
2  - Services
3  - Industry
Total  returns  to human  capital  are  a time-weighted  sum  of returns
in each  sector.  I assume  Cobb-Douglas  return  functions
R-  toSf  tflSf  +  tf2sf  +tf3s )  (4a)
R - tS'  +(  t Sp  +  t St  + ts  )  (4b)
m  mO m  ml  m  m2  m  m3 m
where tfi  and  t  i  is the  fraction  of time  devoted  devoted  to activity  i  by
female  and  male childcen  respectively  when  they  are  adults, 5 and
SAlternatively,  ti  can  be interpreted  as the  probability  of  the  child
being  employed  in sector  i  as an adult.
73  3
E tts  - tot  ,  S
The following  assumptions  are  made:
(i)  tfo  x  to  :  Everybody  gets  married  and  has children,  and  women  spend
more time  at  hom-.,  than  men. This  could  be because  bearing  and  rearing
children  is  more demanding  of women's  time.  (See,  for  related
examples,  Becker  1985).  This  raises  the  issue  of  endogeneity,  since
women  may  choose  not  to  have children.  In that  case,  from  the
viewpoirt  of this  theory,  the  difference  between  men and  women
disappears.  Alternatively,  it can  be explained  as a cultural  or
institutional  constraint.  In any  case,  because  of time  constraint
(5),  women  generally  have less  time  for  market  activities  than  men.
(Li) p <  I  s  6 :  The rates  of return  to schooling  are  high in the
industrial  and  service  sectors  and low  in the  agricultural  sector. 6
However,  these  rates  of return  do not  depend  upon the  sex  of the
workers:  There  is  no sex  discrimination  in the  marketplace. 7
Slnce  the  productivity  of schooling  at home,  a,  is  not easily  or
SAlthough  I do not  have  measures  of the  rates  of return  to  schooling
in  agriculture  compared  to the  other  two  sectors,  there  is strong  evidence
for  Peru that  supports  this  assumption.  Schafgans  (1990)  finds  that  labor
force  participation  of  both  men and  women  in agriculture  declines  with
education,  and  participation  in the  nonagricultural  wage  sector  (sectors
2 and  3 in  this  paper)  increases  as the  education  of  workers  increases.
7The  point is  not .hat  there  is  In fact  no discrimination  against
women.  The  rationale  for  this  assumption  is simply  that  discrimination
(either  at  home or in the  market)  is a  very  di.  ficult  concept  to  quantify.
Since  the  focus  of this  paper  is  empirical,  I  abstract  from  assertions  that
are  unverifiable  either  in  principle  or in  practice.
8directly  observable,  nothing  is  assumed  about  the  magiicude  of  a
relative  to P,  7,  and 6.
It  is  important  to  remember  that  t  1 and  t, are  not  choice
variables  for  the  parents.  These  are  time-allocation  decisions  by  children
when  they  become  adults. The  only  choice  variables  in  the  current
framework  are  S ,  sand  C. Parents  may Impute the  values  of t  and t
from  their  own  experiences  and  expectations  of  market  conditions  when  thair
children  will  work.  Tlis  point  will  be  discussed  later.
Parents  maximize  their  (one-period)  utility  function  given  in
equation  (1)  subject  to  the  budget  constraint  (3).  The  first  order
conditions  for  maximization  are  :
u  *t  a SC I+ (  t  -p  S  1  t -i  St 1+  t  S6 1  AP  0  (6a)
BR  [  £-1  ( t  a  j  1  t37 S11+ e~  Ss  )31  - AP  - 0  (6a)
813  -A  - 0  (6c)
aC
8This  assumes  that  there  is  no  bargaining  about  transfers  from  the
children  to  the  parents.  Suppose  instead  that  contracts  bind  children  to
support  their  parents  when  they  are  old.  Theh  parents  may  in  fact  decide  t
aR~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~f
and  t~ as  well.
Niotice  that  there  is a  self-fulfilling  naturet  the  parents'decision.
If  parents  choose  the  schooling  levels  under  the  assumption  of  a  set  of  t
and  t , and  if  they  are  correct  about  the  rates  of  return  to  schooling  in
each  sector,  children  cannot  do  better  than  allocate  their  time  exactly  as
their  parents  expected.
9Y-  C  - P(sf+ S  )  - O  (6d)
We can  solve  for  the  demand  functions  for  S  ,  S  and  C. The
schooling  demand  functions  will  be of the  form
*
Sf  - S (Y, P  , to, tI,  t2,  t)  (7a)
S  - S (Y, P ,  to,  t  , t  )  (7b) m  8~~~ 0  1  2  3
where t ,  i - 0,1,2,3  are combinations of t  and t1 for each i. Note
that  since  both parents  have the  same  utility  function,  only  aggregate  t
enter  the  schooling  demand  functions.  These  can  be written  as
S  - S(Y'  P,  ,  t, t  , t  )  (8a)
SA  - S  (Y, P,  t, t  ,  t)  (Sb) m  m  S  1  2  3
Equations  %3a)  and (8b)  incorporate  the  additional  constraint  faced  by
women,  tfo  to (that  they  must spend  at least  a fixed  fraction  t  of
their  time  at home),  in the  functional  form,  S  f(.).  Since  females  are
expected  to  marry  and  become  mothers,  the  functional  form  of schooling
demand  will differ  from  that  of  males.  Other  than  this  restriction,  however,
there  is  no difference  between  boys  and  girls.
The  signs  of as;!  8Ps  and aS/  aY  (and  dS  / aPs  and aS  / aY  )  are
predicted  by standard  consumer  theory  as  being  negative  and  positive
respectively,  if quality  of children  is  a normal  good.  Assuming  that  parents
value  the  happiness  of male  and female  children  equally,  the  theory
10Following  Becker  (1981),  parents  are  altruistic  toward  their
children.
10predicts  that  these  coefficients  will  be roughly  equal  in  magnitude  if the
curvature  in the  utility  function  is  small.  That is,  if the  second
derivatives,  a  2s/  P 8
2 and  a2S*/  ay2 (and  82S*/  8p%2  and  82S*/  dY)  are
close  to  zero.  If these  coefficients  are  different  for  males  and females,
and  since  we know that  mean levels  of S  f  are small  compared  to S ,  this  is
indicative  of curvature  in the  utility  function.
However,  the  theory  as it stands  contains  no predictions  regarding
the  magnitudes  of aS/ at  , OSf at 2 and  S/ 8t3  relative  to  8S*/  at,
3  m~~~~Z 
cSi  at 2 and  AS*/  at 3 respectively.  More structure  is  needed  to determine
whether,  for  example,  an increase  in the  time  spent  by parents  in sectoLs  2
and  3 (relative  to sector  0 and/or  1) increases  or decreases  the  demand  for
children's  education  and  whether  these  magnitudes  of response  are  different
for  females  than for  males.
113.  SOME  THEORETICAL  EXTENSIONS
The  theory  predicts  that  within  a  region,  as  a sector  with  a
relatively  high  rate  of  return  to  education  increases  its  share  in  total
employment,  demand  for  the  education  of  children  in  that  region  will  rise. 1
The  limitations  of  the  framework  are:
(1)  The  theory  contains  no  implications  for  the  gender  composition  of  this
increase  in  demand  for  schooling:  It  assumes  that  if  an  education-
intensive  sector  (say,  industry)  increases  in  importance,  the  demand  for
schooling  of  boys  and  girls  will  rise  symmetrically.  The  theory  is  now
extended  to  allow  for  systematic  differences  across  sex  to  such  shifts
in  the  demand  curve  for  schooling.
(2)  The  theory  assumes  that  the  local  structure  of  the  economy  (tI,  t 2 ,  and
t  of  the  parents)  determines  the  demand  for  education.  This  raises  the
question  of  how  parents  form  expectations  regarding  their  children's
future.  Issues  such  as  the  likelihood  and  ease  of  migration  may  be
significant,  and  these  factors  may  not  be  gender-neutral.  Also,  since
the  rate  of  return  to  schooling  in  the  home  sector,  a, is  not  observed
directly  (that  is,  in  terms  of  wages),  perceptions  regarding  a  may  be
related  to  household  attributes  such  as  the  education  of  the  mother.
l 1If  the  industrial  sector  increases  in  importance,  relative  to
services  and/or  agriculture,  we  expect  schooling  to  rise.  Similarly,  if
the  service  sector's  share  rises  relative  to  agriculture,  with  no  change  In
the  share  of  the  Industrial  sector,  then  the  demand  for  education  will
unambiguously  increase.  However,  if  the  share  of  industry  declines  at  the
same  time  that  the  share  of  services  rises,  the  effect  on  aggregate
schooling  demand  is  ambiguous.
12Experience  as  a  Factor  of  Production
The  only  distinction  between  men  and  women  is  that,  in  general
3  3
i1  tz  A-1  x  9
since  tto  to  > tM 0;  women  must  spend  more  time  at  home  than  men.  Suppose
now  that  experience  in  sector  3 (time  allocated  to  sector  3  activities)  adds
to  the  returns  to  schooling  in  that  sector,  but  the  other  sectors'  rates  of
return  to  schooling  are  not  dependent  on  the  time  spent.  That  is
6  - 8 (t 3),  6S  >  0  (10)
So  the  returns  to  schooling  functions  (equations  (4a)  and  (4b)  )  are
rewritten  as
- t sCs  +  [ t  1So +  t S7  +  t  s6(tf3))  (lla)
a  - t S'  +  t  So +  t S  ' + t s6(tm3)j  (llb)
X  ml  m  W  m  W  3
Combined  with  restriction  (9),  equations  (Ila)  and  (llb)  imply  that  males
will  allocate  more  time  to  the  industry  sector  than  equally  schooled
females  because,  holding  educational  attainment  constant,  women  spend  less
time  in  market  activities  than  males.  This  implies  that  men  have  a
comparative  advantage  in  working  in  market  sectors  where  the  returns  to
schooling  increase  with  time  spent. 12
For  example,  assume  there  are  two  levels  of  education:  high  and
laAlternatively,  the  comparative  advantage  of  women  in  services  may
simply  be  due  to  the  fact  that  servicee  provide  more  opportunities  to  work
close  to  home  than  does  industry  (Smith  and  Stelcner  1990).
13low.  Industry  and  services  use only  workers  with  high levels  of education,
while  agriculture  uses  workers  with low  levels  of education  (regardless  of
sex).  Workers  with  high levels  of schooling  will  work in the  other  two
sectors.  Assume  that  experience  is rewarded  in industry  and  not in services
(a  simplification).  More schooled  workers  with  higher  amounts  of allocable
market  time (males)  will be employed  in industry.  More schooled  females  will
work in the  services  sector,  where  the  returns  to schooling  do not  depend
on experience.
One  consequence  is that  an increase  in the industrial  sector's
share  of GDP  will  raise  the  demand  for  education  by both  males  and females,
but  more for  males.  Conversely,  a rise  in the  service  sector's  share  in
total  employment  will increase  the  demand  for  schooling  by both  male and
females,  but  more for  females.  These  are testable  implications  of the
theory.
Forming  of Expectations
The  model  assumes  that  parents,  in deciding  how to educate  their
offspring,  base the  decision  on the  amount  of time  the  parents  spend  on four
areas:  household  activities,  agriculture,  services,  and  industry,  and the
rates  of return  to schooling  in  each  of these  sectors.  For example,  they
expect  daughters  to  allocate  time  the  same  way as the  mother,  and sons  to
follow  their  father's  patterns.  They further  expect  that  the  relative  rates
of return  to schooling  in  each sector  will  remain  unchanged.  In the  context
of Peru in the  1980s  this  assumption  is likely  to  be incorrect,  since  a
14large  flow  of migrants  moves  between  rural  and  urban  areas.
This sub-section  modifiies  the  theory  to allow  for  migration.
Parents  have some information  about  potential  work opportunities  for  their
children  (other  than  their  own  occupations)  and incorporate  this
information  into  the  decision  on their  children's  education.  So, for
example,  parents  may  use the  average  levels  of t  and t i in the  region  or
country  to determine  the  probability  of employment  of female  and  male
children  in  sector  i. Parents  may  use  t1 (averaged  over  both sexes)  in
deciding  how  much to  educate  their  children.  This  may entail  migration  by
children  when they  are  adults;  this  migration  may or  may not  be
gender-neutral.
Vector  Z is  added  as an argument  in the  two  schooling  equations
s  _  S (Y, P,  t,  t  , t  Z)  (12a)
f  f  S  1  2  3
S  Sm(Y,  P  , t,  t, t Z) . (12b)
m  m  s  1  2  3
where  Z represents  both linfrastructural"  variables  (Z 1) that  represent
the  ability  of adults  to  migrate,  and  household-specific  variables  (Z2 )  that
represent  the  ability  of the  parents  to  decode  information  regarding
potential  opportunities  for  children.  Z includes  both factors  that  determine
the  degree  to  which  employment  in  each  sector  is  perceived  as possible  (tfi
and  tm,  for i  - 0,1,2,3)  and  factors  that  determine  the  accuracy  with  which
parents  observe  the  true  rates  of return  to schooling  (a,  fi,  - and  6).
In the  empirical  sections,  both  equations  (8)  and (12)  will  be
estimated  to  see  whether  or not these  variables  Z have independent  and
15gender-variant  effects  on  investment  in  schooling.  These  equations  were
estimated  both  by  ordinary  least  squares  (OLS)  and  two-stage  least  squares
(TSLS)  techniques  to  account  for  possible  endogeneity  of  household  income.
The  results  were  very  similar.  In  this  paper  only  the  TSLS  results  are
reported.
164. HOUSEHOLD  LEVEL EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Analysis  at the  household  level  has  several  advantages.  First,  since
the  theoretical  model is  one  of household  decisions,  empirical  testing
should  be done  at the  household  level.  Second,  it is  possible  to quantify
the  effect  of intrahousehold  distribution  of potential  or actual  earnings
(for  instance,  the  education  or earnings  of the  mother  compared  to the
father's)  on investment  in the  human  capital  of children.  Third,  the  measure
of investment  is  more reliable  for  the  households  than  the  illiteracy  rates
used in the  next section,  and  the  primary  and  secondary  school  enrollment
rates  used in  Gill and  Khandker  (1990).
The sample  should  ideally  consist  of  households  in the  PLSS  that
have at least  one  male and  one  female  child  of school  age.  But  when the
sample  was restricted  to such  households,  the  number  of observations  dropped
significantly.
Definition  of Dependent  Variable:  Schooling  Shortfalls
The  problems  in  comparing  schooling  levels  of  boys and  girls  are:
o  Each  boy and  girl is likely  to  have different  levels  of access  to
schooling,  such  as  household  income,  distance  from school,  quality
of schools  available,  and  so on.
O  The  boy and  girl  being  compared  are likely  to differ  in  age, and
hence on this  account  alone  would  differ  in  years  of completed
schooling.  Thus  we need to  use  a measure  of educational  attainment
adjusted  for  age.
O  A related  complication  is  that  time  or cohort  effects  will be confused
17with the  true  schooling  differentials.  Suppose,  for  example,  that the
government  makes  primary  school  attendance  compulsory  for  all  children
between  5 to 10  years  of age  in year  t. Then  comparing  the  adjusted
schooling  attainment  of a girl  who is 10 years  old in  year t+5  with a
boy who is 15 in the  same  year is likely  to understate  the  actual
difference  in the  schooling  of girls.  Conversely,  comparing  a  boy who
is 10 in  year t+5  with  a girl  who is 15 in the  same  year  will overstate
this  difference.  It is important  to  weed out  these  cohort-specific
effects.
To resolve  the  first  problem,  we have included  family
characteristics  in the  regression.  Regarding  the  second  problem,  the
comparison  is not  between  attained  schooling  but shortfalls  in schooling
attainment  of  boys and  girls.  This shortfall,  for  a child  J, is  defined  as
(AgeJ  - 5) - (Schooling in Years)  - (Schooling Shortfall) ,  for j - f,m.
That is,  the  shortfall  is  equal  to potential  schooling  (age-5)  minus  actual
13
schooling  (alternatively,  the  highest  grade  completed). The  nice thing
about  this  measure  is that  it is a familiar  one: it is identical  to Mincer's
(1974)  definition  of potential  work experience  for  adults.  The only
13Within  the  household,  it is also  possible  to  compare  the  quality
of schools  attended  by male  children  versus  the  quality  of schools  attended
by female  children.  For  example,  in the  PLSS,  it is  possible  to  determine
whe-her  the  child  attended  a private  or a public  school.  Indices  of quality
of schooling  of and  school-related  expenditure  on male and  female  offspring
can  be incorporatod  to  make the  schooling  differential  variable  better
approximate  differential  investment  in  schooling  rather  than  differential
schooling  attainment.
18difference  is in its  application.  We deal  with the  third  problem  by
estimating  cohort-specific  schooling  equations,  estimating  separately  for
each  of five  age  groups:  6-15  years,  16-25  years,  26-35  years,  16-45  years
and  46-65  years.14
Definitions  of Independent  Variables
Y:  Household  Income  is  proxied  by using  total  (food  and  nontood)
expenditures  in the  household.  'The  advantages  of using  expenditures
rather  than  income  are that:  (a)  expenditures  are  less  subject  to
errors  in reporting,  since  they  are reported  by component.  Each
component  (food,  clothing,  and  so on) is less  likely  to  be
systematically  under-  or over-reported;  and (b)  total  expenditures
are a  better  proxy  for  permanent  income,  which  is generally  the
relevant  budget  constraint.
The  disadvantages  are  that:  (a)  since  expenditures  on schooling  are
a  component  of the  total,  the  issue  of endogeneity  of a right-hand
sidf  variable  becomes  a problem;  and (b)  schooling  levels  and
14Ideally,  to purge  cohort  effects  from  the  comparison  of male  and
female  schooling  levels,  the  following  procedure  should  be adopted.  The
average  schooling  shortfall  for  male children  in each  cohort  group  is first
calculated.  Then the  difference  of the  schooling  shortfall  of each  child i,
male and female,  from the  average  schooling  shortfall  of  male children  in
the  cohort  that  child  i  belongs  to, is  defined  as
M  (t)
(Schooling  Shortfall) - JE  (Male  Schooling  Shortfall)k  /  M(t)  - Si
j  - m, f; and k - 1, 2 ......  M(t)
where  j  denotes  the  male children  in the  cohort,  t, that i  belongs  to,  and
M(t) is the  number  of  males in  cohort  t.
19household  income  may  be jointly  determined  by other  variables,  and
this results  in simultaneous  equations  bias. (See  Schultz  1989  for  a
discussion  of this  problem  for  fertility  decisions.)
To overcome  these  problems,  the  estimation  isi  done in two  stages.
The  first  stage  consists  of estimating  household  expenditures  per
adult  from the  following  regression
Expenditures/Adult  - f  +  C Age  +  4  Age2  +  C Schooling
O  1  2  3
+  C Schooling  +  C Training  +  C Public  School?
4  ~~~~5  6
+  C  Landholding  +  (*Unearned  Income
+  (  Rural  +  f  (13)
Age, Schooling  and  Training  are  the  age,  education,  and training  of
the  head of the  household  and the  spouse,  Public  School?  is a  binary
variable  that a0ks whether  the  head and  spouse  attended  a private  or a
public  school,  Rural is  a region  dummy  which  equals  1 if the  region  of
residence  is rural,  and  0 otherwise,  Landholding  is the total  area of
land  sown  or rented  out  by the  household,  and  Unearned  Income  is the
sum  of all income  other  than  wage and salaries.  The fitted  values  used
are  from  a regression  that  excludes  Landholding,  because  the  sample
was reduced  to  one-third  of its  size  when landholding  was included.
The full  regression  results  are  in  Appendix  I.
t:  The structure  of the  economy,  or the  time  spent  in  each of the three
market  sectors,  t1, t2, and t 3, is  proxied  by their  Share  In
Departmental  GDP.
20ti  - Share  of  agriculture  (farming,  fishing  and  frestry),
ta  Share  ef  services  (personal  and  business  services,  health  care,
hotels,  tourism,  and  so on),
-3  - Share  of  industry  (manufacturing,  mining,  construction,  and  so
on),
averaged  over  1979-85.  Ideally,  I  would  also  have  experimented  with
the  share  of  each  sector  in  department  employment,  but  data  were  not
available.  It  may  be  more  appropriate  to  use  sector  shares  in  income,
since  it  is  the  earning  power  of  children  that  parents  are  concerned
about,  not  hours  worked.  Using  sectoral  shares  in  departmental  GDP  as
proxies  for  ti  assumes  that  within  each  sector,  the  labor  intensity  of
production  does  not  change  as  sectoral  output  changes.
p-  Changes  in  P5  are  proxied  by  a  rural-urban  dutwi  variable.  I  assume
that  the  price  of  schooling  is  lower  .n  urban  than  in  rural  regions.
This  could  be  because  the  average  distance  to  school  in  rural  regions
is  greater  than  that  in  urban  regions.  Thus  within  each  department,
the  parameter  P 8 varies  with  region  of  residence.
Z2 The  estimation  in  this  section  uses  household  data  from  the  PLSS  for
subset  Z2  variables,  as  follows:
is
15Alternatively,  it  could  be  because  rural  areas  are  generally
agricultural,  and  urban  areas  are  more  industrial.  If  children's  labor  is
more  valuable  in  agrarian  economies,  then  the  price  of  schooling  would
include  the  higher  opportunity  cost  in  rural  areas.  This  effect  confounds
the  structure  of  the  economy  with  the  rural-urban  decomposition,  and  is
ignored  here.
21(1)  Hlghest  level  of education  completed  by Mother
(2)  Highest  level  of education  completed  by Father
(3)  Mother's  Longest  Occupation
(4)  Father's  Longest  Occupation
The level  of education  of the  paz.nts  is  measured  as follows:
-1  - Never attended, 0  - None, 1 - Initial, 2 - Primary, 3 -
Regular  secondary,  4 - Technical  secondary,  5  - Postsecondary
Non-university,  6 - University.
The  occupation  of the  parents  is  measured  as follows:
1 - Did not work, 2 - Missing and not elsewhere classified,
3 - Agriculture, Fishing and Forestry, 4 - Sales vendors, 5 -
Service  workers,  6 - Production  & Transportation,  7 - Clerical,
8 - Professional  and  Government.
The education  levels  of the  mother  and  father  are included  to capture
information-processing  abilities  of the  household.  Educated  parents
are likely  to  be better  informed  about  the  true  rates  of return  to
their  children's  education.  The  occupation  of each  parent  is included
to test  whether  parents  base their  expectations  for  their  children  on
their  own  experiences,  or wihether  the  crucial  determinant  is the
general  structure  of  production  in the  region  of residence  (as  proxied
by province  t  ratios). 16
±
16The  education  of the  mother  relative  to that  of the  father,  when
their  wages  or incomes  are  not included,  may also indicate  the  extent  of
female  control  of the  household  budget  Y. Occupations  of the  mother  and
father  are  more likely  to  proxy  share  in  actual  earned  income  of the
household.  Education,  when occupation  is included,  better  proxies  potential
earned  income.  To the  extent  that  the  "bargaining  position"  of females
depends  on the  income-earning  capability  of the  mother,  and  not income
actually  earned,  the  mother's  schooling  will  have an independent  effect  on
22Results  of the  Schooling  Regressions
The general  form  of the  estimated  equations  is
S  - S  (Y, P 5 t,  t 2, t  Z) for  females,  (14a)
f  f  s  1  2  :
S  - S(Y,  P,  t,  t, t  Z) for  males.  (14b)
*  m  s  1  2  3
Since  the tL  as measured  add  up to i, only two  of the  three  shares  can  be
included  in  a regression.  The aim is  to examine  the  relative  increases  in
the  demand  for  schooling  as educati.on-intensive  sectors  grow in importance,
and  particularly  whether  industrial  growth  raises  the  demand  for  boys'
education  more than  girls'.  To hold the  share  of services  constant  while
increasing  the  share  of industry,  we must include  both the  high education
sectors  in the  regression,  and  omit  the  low  education  sector.
Another  aspect  of the  problem  of multicollinearity  is that  the
share  of agriculture  in GDP (the  omitted  class)  and  the  degree  of
urbanization  are  highly  (negatively)  correlated.  Since  che  share  of
agriculture  is equal  to 1  minus  the  sum  of the  shares  of services  and
industry,  this  leads  to  high degree  of multicollinearity  in the  above
regressions.  To overcome  this  problem,  I  use a four-way  classification,  with
government  services  as the  fourth  category.  The results  below  are
computed  with two  classes,  industry  and  nongovernment  services,  and two
omitted  classes,  agriculture  and government  services.  Since  the  share  of
gender  equity  in child  investments.  Studies  have also  found  that the
father's  education  has significant  positive  effects  on the  schooling  of
children.  (See  for  example,  Moock  and  Leslie  1986.)  The education  of both
parents  is  hypothesized  to  have  a positive  effect  on the  schooling  of both
sons  ans  daughters.
23government  services  is about .07,  it is  not a  very important  category
quantitatively,  but it  helps  to overcome  the  multicollinearity  problem."
The regressions  estimated  for  females  are:
Sf  00  +  01Household-Income  +  02Share-of-Industry
+  03Share-of-Services  +  + Urbanization
+  0 Father's  Education +  48Mother's  Education
+  47Father's  Occupation +  8Mother's Occupation  +  f  (15a)
and  for  males  are:
S  - p0  +  p  Household  Income +  p2Share-of-Industry
+  3Share-of-Services  +  p  Urbanization
+  /5Father's  Education +  jAMother's  Education
+  p7Father's  Occupation  +  p8Mother0s Occupation +  e  (15b)
The  primary  hypotheses  to  be tested  are:
HI.  < 0,  p1 <  0 :  Schooling  of the  girl  and the  boy are  normal  goods.
H2.  46  <  p1 :  Since  levels  of schooling  of girls  are lower  to  begin  with,
this  would imply  that  equity  in  human  capital  investments  across  sexes
is a normal  good.
H3.  02 < 0,  p2  <  0 :  Demand  for  schooling  increases  as the  share  of
17To test  whether  multicollinearity  was severe,  I  used the  singular
value  decomposition  technique  advocated  by Belsley  and  others  (1980).  This
test is  essentially  a  measure  of the  sensitivity  of coefficients  to  changes
in the  matrix  of independent  variables.  This sensitivity  is summarized  as
(square  root  of) the  ratio  of the  largest  eigenvalue  of the  X'X matrix  to
the  smallest,  and is called  a "condition  index."  Condition  indices  of less
than  30 are  considered  good,  and those  between  30 to 100  are  considered  to
be indicative  of moderate  to strong  multicollinearity  (see  Judge  and  others
1985).  The largest  condition  index  for  the  regressions  in this  paper  was
about  26.
24industry  increases  at the  expense  of agriculture,  holding  the  share  of
services  constant.
H4. 02  >  2  :  Men have  a cDmparative  advantage  in industry,  since  it
rewards  work experience  as  well as schooling.  So when the  share  of
industry  rises  holding  the  share  of services  constant,  the  demand  for
male schooling  rises  by more  than  the  demand  for  female  schooling.
H5. 43 <  0,  A3  <  O :  Demand  for  schooling  increases  as the  share  of
services  rises  at the  expense  of agriculture,  holding  the  share  of
industry  constant.
H6. 43 <  p3 :  Women  have a comparative  advantage  in  services,  since  the
rate  of return  to schooling  in the  services  sector  is independent  of the
time  spent  working  in this  sector.  So when the  share  of services  rises,
holding  the share  of industry  constant,  the  demand  for  female  schooling
rises  by more than  the  demand  for  male schooling.
H7. 04  <  0,  p  <  0 :  A fall  in the  supply  price  of schooling  associated
with greater  urbanization,  holding  the  demand  schedule  for  schooling
constant,  will  raise  schooling  investments  in  both girls  and  boys.
H8. 04'<  p4 :The theory has no predictions about the relative  magnitudes
of the  responses  of male  and female  schooling  to changes  in the  supply
price  of schooling.
Table  2  shows  the  results  for  the  entire  sample  and  separately  for
each  of five  age-groups:  6-15  years,  16-25  years,  26-35  years,  36-45  years,
and  46-65  years.  Schooling  decisions  of those  who  are  more than  35 years  old
were  made  when the  structure  of the  province's  economy  was different.  We
25expect  to find  the  strongest  results  for  groups  that  are finishing  school
(16-25  years)  and  that  have  just  finished  school  (26-35  years).
We expect  to see  that  an increase  in  the  share  of services,
holding  the  share  of industry  constant,  will reduce  the  schooling  shortfall
of females  by more than  that  of  males.  For industry,  the  effect  on male
schooling  should  be stronger  than  the  effect  on female  schooling.  The
results  indicate  that  for  the  sample  as a whole,  increases  in the  share  of
services  are significantly  and  negatively  correlated  with  schooling
shortfall  for  females,  but  not for  males.  The  share  coefficient  in the
female  regressions  is greater  in  magnitude  for  the  services  sector  than  for
industry.  For  males,  on the  other  hand,  it is the  share  of industry  that  is
significant  (at  the  5  or 10  percent  level).  This  is exactly  what our theory
predicted.
Results  by age  group  show that  coefficients  for  the  shares  of
services  and industry  are insignificant  for  the  age groups  6-15,  36-45,  and
46-65  years.  For the  group  16-25  years  old, the  coefficient  for  the  share  of
services  is significant  at the  1  or 5 percent  level.  For the  group  26-35
years  old, the  share  of industry  and  services  show strong  results.
Reassuringly,  the  correlation  between  the  share  of services  and  schooling
seems  to  be stronger  for  females  than  for  males.  However,  the  magnitude  is
greater  for the  services  sector  for  both  sexes  --  a contradiction  of the
theory.  For  each  of the  age  groups,  the  coefficient  for  the  share  of
industry  is never  significant  for  females.  However,  for  males in the  two
groups  26-35  and 36-45  years,  the  coefficient  of the  share  of industry  is
26significantly  negative  at the  10  percent  level  of significance.
For  the  age-specific  estimates,  the  degree  of urbanization
decreases  the  schooling  shortfall  of females,  but  not  necessarily  that  of
males.  Surprisingly,  urbanization  has  a strong  unfavorable  influence  on the
schooling  shortfall  for  males in the  pooled  regressions.  In the  context  of
our  model,  where  the  rural  dummy  proxies  the  price  of schooling,  this
implies  that  lowering  the  price  of schooling  increases  the  schooling  of
females  more than  males.
The  education  of  both father  and  mother  have significant  positive
effects  on schooling.  The education  of the  mother  is  more  closely  associated
with the  schooling  of daughters,  and  the  education  of the  father  with the
schooling  of sons.  The occupation  of the  mother  never  matters,  while the
occupation  of the  father  seldom  matters,  with  higher  occupation  implying  a
lower  schooling  shortfall  for  both female  and  male offspring.  Household
income  has  a strong  beneficial  effect  on all  groups  except  children  aged
6-15  years.  A surprising  finding  was that  household  income  has a stronger
effect  on schooling  of male  children  than  female  children.  Thus  while
investment  in  education  is  a normal  good,  the  data reject  the  view that
gender  equity  is  a normal  good  when  demand-side  factors  are included.  That
is,  increases  in  household  income  per  se will  not lower  the  gender  gap in
schooling.
27Table 1
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF VARIABLES BY HOUSEHOLDS IN PERU: 1985-86
Variables  Mean  Standard
Deviations
Department-Level  RMS Variables:
Share of Industry in Dept.GDP  0.36  0.14
Share of Agriculture in Dept.GDP  0.18  0.13
Share of Services etc.in Dept.GDP  0.39  0.13
Share of Govt. Services in Dept.GDP  0.07  0.03
Degree of Urbanization  66.99  25.49
Household-Level  RHS Variables:
Predicted Household Income  787.26  385.13
Place of Residence (Dummy: 1-Rural, 0-Urban)  0.43  0.49
Household Size  6.48  2.75
Total Landholding (Acres)  9.21  76.01
Individual-Level  RHS Variables:
Father's Education Level  1.48  1.76
Mother's Education Level  0.48  1.68
Father's Occupation  4.28  1.67
Mother's Occupation  2.98  1.63
Individual-Level  LHS  Variables:
Female: Education in Years  4.59  4.10
Male  : Education in Years  5.49  4.13
Female: Highest Level of Education Completed  1.94  1.69
Male  :  Highest Level of Education Completed  2.43  1.50
Female: Age in Years  26.70  16.04
Male  :  Age in  Years  26.12  16.13
Female Schooling Shortfall: 6-15 years  2.76  1.92
Male Schooling Shortfall: 6-15 years  2.57  1.73
Female Schooling Shortfall: 16-25 years  7.89  4.35
Male Schooling Shortfall: 16-25 years  7.34  3.75
Female Schooling Shortfall: 26-35 years  18.76  5.84
Male Schooling Shortfall: 26-35 years  16.89  5.28
Female Schooling Shortfall: 36-45 years  31.01  5.67
Male Schooling Shortfall: 36-45 years  29.02  5.76
Female Schooling Shortfall: 46-65 years  46.33  7.03
Male Schooling Shortfall: 46-65 years  44.54  7.13
28Table  2
HOUSEHOLD-LEVEL  SCHOOLING  REGRESSIONS:  PERU,  1985-86
Independent  Equation  1  Equation  2  Equation  3
Variables  Female  Male  Female  Male  Female  Male
All  Age  Groups
Constant  -5.043  -3.841  -5.342  -3.665  -5.031  -3.899
(0.64)  (0.62)  (0.62)  (0.62)  (0.64)  (0.64)
Industry  share  -1.640  -1.310  -1.002  -1.166  -0.943  -1.172
(0.68)  (0.67)  (0.67)  (0.67)  (0.67)  (0.67)
Services  share  -3.215  -1.281  -2.251  -1.112  -2.165  -1.216
(0.83)  (0.82)  (0.81)  (0.81)  (0.82)  (0.82)
Rural  dummy  0.836  -0.527  0.233  -0.678  0.197  -0.715
(0.20)  (0.20)  (0.20)  (0.21)  (0.21)  (0.21)
Household  income  -0.007  -0.010  -0.006  -0.010  -0.006  -0.010
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)
Father's  education  -0.419  -0.304  -0.388  -0.302
(0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)
Mother's  education  -0.574  0.007  -0.556  -0.005
(0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)
Father's  occupation  -0.129  0.022
(0.06)  (0.06)
Mother's  occupation  -0.015  0.085
(0.05)  (0.05)
Age  group  11.251  11.181  11.091  11.116  11.096  11.120
(0.06)  (0.06)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07)
2 Adjusted  R  0.885  0.899  0.892  0.900  0.892  0.900
Sample  size  4281  4024  4281  4024  4281  4024
Note: Dependent variable is schooling shortfall - age - schooling - 5
Significant  at 10  percent,  at 5  percent  level,  at 1  percent  level.
Standard  errors  in  parentheses.
29Table  2 (Continued)
HOUSEHOLD-LEVEL  SCHOOLING  REGRESSIONS:  PERU,  1985-86
Independent  Equation  1  Equation  2  Equation  3
Variable.-  Female  Male  Female  Male  Female  Male
Population  Aged  6 to 15  years
Constant  0.765  2.768  1.448  3.378  1.595  3.209
(1.40)  (1.41)  (1.38)  (1.00)  (1.39)  (1.03)
Industry  share  2.474  1.201  2.047  1.152  2.518  1.106
(1.58)  (1.31)  (1.52)  (1.24)  (1.56)  (1.24)
Services  share  1.680  -0.297  3.101  0.179  3.827  0.071
(2.00)  (1.65)  (1.92)  (1.57)  (2.05)  (1.60)
Rural  dummy  1.928  0.168  1.383  0.142  1.424  0.125
(0.49)  (0.40)  (0.49)  (0.38)  (0.49)  (0.38)
Household  income  0.001  -0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  -0.000
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)
Father's  education  -0.042  -0.309  -0.010  -0.335
(0.14)  (0.12)  (0.14)  (0.13)
Mother's  education  -0.465  -0.163  -0.433  -0.193
(0.12)  (0.10)  (0.13)  (0.11)
Father's  occupation  -0.129  0.027
(0.11)  (0.11)
Mother's  occupation  -0.056  0.109
(0.10)  (0.09)
Adjusted  R2 0.092  -0.009  0 t91  0.102  0.189  0.101
Sample  size  156  170  156  170  156  170
Note: Dependent variable is schooling shortfall - age - schooling - 5
Significant  at 10  percent,  at 5  percent  level,  at 1 percent  level.
Standard  errors  in  parentheses.
30Table 2 (Continued)
HOUSEHOLD-LEVEL SCHOOLING REGRESSIONS: PERU, 1985-86
Independent  Equation 1  Equation 2  Equation 3
Variables  Female  Male  Female  Male  Female  Male
Population Aged 16 to 25 years
Constant  14.305  16.296**  14.038  14.353  14.689  14.039
(1.13)  (1.26)  (1.08)  (1.24)  (1.11)  (1.31)
Industry share  -1.173  -0.866  -0.912  -0.355  -0.813  -0.388
(1.28)  (1.57)  (1.21)  (1.52)  (1.21)  (1.52)
Services share  -5.117  -4.939  -4.479  -4.084  -4.106  -4.243
(1.61)  (1.70)  (1.52)  (1.66)  (1.53)  (1.66)
Rural dummy  2.333  1.927  1.828  1.383  1.685  1.336
(0.41)  (0.45)  (0.39)  (0.45)  (0.39)  (0.45)
Household income  -0.003  -0.004  -0.002  -0.004  -0.001  -0.003
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)
Father's education  -0.404  -0.416  -0.340  -0.420
(0.11)  (0.12)  (0.11)  (0.13)
Mother's education  -0.616  -0.282  -0.573  -0.304
(0.10)  (0.12)  (0.11)  (0.12)
Father's occupation  -0.328  0.031
(0.11)  (0.11)
Mother's occupation  0.123  0.117
(0.08)  (0.09)
2
Adjusted R  0.286  0.359  0.366  0.399  0.374  0.399
Sample size  645  445  645  445  645  445
Note: Dependent variable is schooling shortfall =  age - schooling - 5
*  ****
Significant at 10 percent,  at 5 percent level,  at 1 percent level.
Standard errors in parentheses.
31Table  2 (Continued)
HOUSEHOLD-LEVEL  SCHOOLING  REGRESSIONS:  PERU,  1985-86
Independent  Equation  1  Equation  2  Equation  3
Variables  Female  Male  Female  Male  Female  Male
Population  Aged  26  to  35  years
Constant  26.685  26.601  25.9919 26.117  26.662  26.230
(0.99)  (0.93)  (0.95)  (0.92)  (1.00)  (0.97)
Industry  share  -1.384  -1.733  -0.542  -1.590  -0.470  -1.384
(1.12)  (1.01)  (1.07)  (1.00)  (1.07)  (1.00)
Services  share  -3.845  -2.639  -3.233  -2.170  -3.311  -2.124
(1.38)  (1.32)  (1.30)  (1.30)  (1.31)  (1.31)
Rural  dummy  1.862  0.525  1.130  0.305  1.029  0.226
(0.35)  (0.33)  (0.34)  (0.33)  (0.34)  (0.34)
Household  income -0.006  -0.008  -0.004  -0.007  -0.004  -0.007
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)
Father's  education  -0.538  -0.303  -0.471  -0.272
(0.10)  (0.09)  (0.10)  (0.09)
Mother's  education  -0.606  -0.262  -0.576  -0.261
(0.10)  (0.09)  (0.10)  (0.09)
Father's  occupation  -0.245- -0.121
(0.10)  (0.09)
Mother's  occupation  0.031  0.093
(0.07)  (0.07)
2 Adjusted  R  0.404  0.500  0.462  0.515  0.464  0.515
Sample  size  1148  957  1148  957  1148  957
Note: Dependent variable is schooling shortfall - age - schooling - 5
Significant  at 10  percent,  at 5  percent  level,  at 1  percent  level.
Standard  errors  in  parentheses.
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HOUSEHOLD-LEVEL  SCHOOLING  REGRESSIONS:  PERU,  1985-86
Independent  Equation  1  Equation  2  Equation  3
Variables  Female  Male  Female  Male  Female  Male
-Population  Aged 36 to 45  years
Constant  38.049  39.942  36.471  39.570  36.795  39.437
(0.97)  (0.84)  (0.93)  (0.85)  (0.97)  (0.89)
Industry  share  -0.730  -1.850  0.073  -1.404  0.074  -1.448
(1.15)  (0.94)  (1.10)  (0.94)  (1.10)  (0.93)
Services  share  -0.005  -1.650  1.033  -1.360  1.136  -1.407
(1.36)  (1.18)  (1.29)  (1.17)  (1.30)  (1.18)
Rural  dummy  0.930  -0.547  0.346  -0.738  0.272  -0.734
(0.35)  (0.30)  (0.34)  (0.31)  (0.34)  (0.31)
Household  income  -0.009  -0.011  -0.006  -0.010  -0.006  -0.010
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)
Father's  education  -0.382  -0.294  -0.339  -0.303
(0.09)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.'09)
Mother's  education  -0.778  -0.095  -0.756  -0.102
(0.10)  (0.09)  (0.10)  (0.09)
Father's  occupation  -0.174  0.044
(0.10)  (0.09)
Mother's  occupation  0.088  0.010
(0.08)  (0.07)
Adjusted  R2 0.435  0.610  0.493  0.617  0.494  0.616
Sample  size  1064  1030  1064  1030  1064  1030
Note:  Dependent  variable  is schooling  shortfall  - age - schooling  - 5
Significant  at 10  percent,  at 5  percent  level,  at 1  percent  level.
Standard  errors  in  parentheses.
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HOUSEHOLD-LEVEL SCHOOLING REGRESSIONS: PERU, 1985-86
Independent  Equation 1  Equation 2  Equation 3
Variabies  Female  Male  Female  Male  Female  Male
Population Aged 46 to 65 years
Constant  54.175  54.047  52.687  54.174  52.731  53.386
(1.29)  (1.14)  (1.28)  (1.15)  (1.36)  (1.22)
Ineustry share  -3.200  -1.246  -2.321  -1.227  -2.353  -1.282
(1.56)  (1.36)  (1.55)  (1.36)  (1.55)  (1.36)
Services share  -4.428  1.215  -2.814  1.153  -2.696  0.910
(1.91)  (1.66)  (1.89)  (1.66)  (1.90)  (1.67)
Rural dummy  0.093  -0.947  -0.498  -0.993  -0.430  -0.996
(0.45)  (0.40)  (0.45)  (0.40)  (0.46)  (0.40)
Household income  -0.008  -0.013  -0.006  -0.012  -0.006  -0.013
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)
Father's education  -0.307  -0.233  -0.331  -0.257
(0.13)  (0.11)  (0.13)  (0.12)
Mother's education  -0.636  0.176  -0.647  0.151
(0.16)  (0.13)  (0.16)  (0.13)
Father's occupation  0.091  0.191
(0.14)  (0.13)
Mother's occupation  -0.146  0.127
(0.11)  (0.10)
Adjusted R  0.201  0.381  0.227  0.382  0.227  0.383
Sample size  1264  1418  1264  1418  1264  1418
Note: Dependent variable is schooling shortfall =  age - schooling - 5
Significant at 10 percent,  at 5 percent level,  at 1 percent level.
Standard Errors in parentheses.
345.  PROVINCE  LEVEL  EMPIRICAL  EVIDENCE
Evidence  from  provincial  data  confirms  the  findings  of the
previous  section.  Because  literacy  and income  data  are  based  on the  census,
the  results  do not reflect  any  sampling  bias in the  PLSS.  In the last
section  the  focus  was  on household  level  variables  (the  subset  Z2 ).  In this
section  I experiment  with  various  infrastructural  parameters  (Z  1),
indicating  the  degree  of development  of transport  and  communications  in each
province  or department.
Using  data  from the  department  level  is tantamount  to  assuming
that  households  within  a department  are identical  with respect  to the
parameters  they  face:  income  (Y),  the  rates  of return  to schooling  in the
three  sectors  (a,  6,  -, and  6),  and  the  time-allocation  parameters  (t  ).
However,  each  department  has two  regions,  rural  and  urban.  As in the
previous  section  I  assume  that  the  price  of schooling  (PS)  is lower  in  urban
than in  rural  regions.
Definitions  of Dependent  Variable:  Illiteracy  Rates
Sr  :  The  census  data  do not  provide  gender-specific  schooling  attainment  or
enrollment  by age  group  for  each department.  Since  illiteracy  rates
are  available  at the  required  level  of disaggregation,  I use  cohort-
specific  illiteracy  rates  as a proxy  for  investment  in schooling  in
the  department.  Clearly,  literacy  rates  are  a gross  approximation  for
schooling  levels.  There  are  two  defenses  for  this  procedure:  First,
the  study  focuses  on the  differences  in  human  capital  between  males
and  females.  Even  though  illiteracy  rates  do not reflect  absolute
35levels  of human  capital  of each sex,  they  may provide  reliable
estimates  of relative  levels.  Second,  total  illiteracy  rates  are
highly  negatively  correlated  with initial,  secondary,  postsecondary,
and  vocational  enrollment  ratios  across  departments  (see  Table  3).
University  level  enrollmEnt  ratios  are  weakly  negatively  correlated
with illiteracy  rates,  but this  is  not surprising.  Somewhat  puzzling
is the  finding  that  primary  school  enrollment  ratios  are  poslelvely
correlated  with illiteracy  rates.  This is  probably  due to the  fact
that  high actual  primary  school  enrollment  relative  to the  number  that
should  be enrolled  may indicate  that  students  have  fallen  behind  in
the  curriculum.
Definitions  of Independent  Variables
Y:  Departmental  gross  domestic  product  per  caplta  is  used as the  measure
for  household  income.
t:  The  structure  of the  economy,  or the  time  spent  in  each of the  three
market  sectors,  tI,  t 2, and  t 3, is  proxied  by their  Share  In
departmental  GDP.  These  variables  are  defined  as in the  previous
section:
ti  - Share  of  Agriculture  (farming,  fishing  and  forestry),
t2 - Share  of Services  (personal  and  business  services,  health  care,
hotels,  tourism,  and  so on),
t3 - Share  of Industry  (manufacturing,  mining,  construction,  and so
on),
36averaged  over 1979-85.
P8:  Changes  in  P8 are  proxied  by the  Degree  of Urbanization  (percentage  of
total  department  population  living  in  urban  areas)  in 1985.  The  degree
of urbanization  is  a continuous  variable.  Therefore  Ps (0  s Ps5  100)
is  a continuous  variable.  I  also  experimented  with a rural-urban  dummy
variable  (P.  - p,v,  where  p and u  are the  price  of schooling  a  child
in  rural  and  in urban  areas  respectively).  This is done  by estimating
male  and female  schooling  regressions  separately  for  rural  and  urban
schooling  levels  across  departments.  However,  income  per capita,  Y,
and  the  potential  work opportunities  by sector,  ti,  are still
department-level:  department  GDP  figures  are  not  available  separately
for  each  region.  Thus it is assumed  that  ti do  noc  vary across
regions  within  a department,  but Ps  does.  This assumes  t-hat,  within  a
department,  it is  costless  for  an adult  to  migrate  from  rural  to  urban
urban  regions  (or  vice  versa),  but the  cost  of sending  a child  to
school  from rural  to  urban  regions  is  very  high.
Z :  The  vector  of department-level  infrastructural  variables  Z  include
Roads  per Square  Kilometer,  and  Post  Offices  per  Square  Kilometer.
I also experimented  with Telegraph  Offices  per  Square  Kilometer,
Telephone  Lines  per Capita,  and  some  other  variables.  Since  household
specific  variables  Z2  are  only  available  in a  household-level  survey,
this  section  only employs  department-level  infrastructural  variables
(subset  Z )  in the  schooling  regressions.
37Description  of the  Data
Table  4 shows  the  means  and standard  deviations  of the  dependent
and all  the  independent  variables  used in the  illiteracy  regressions.
Industry's  share  is  the largest,  but is  also  relatively  more  variable  across
departments  than the  share  of services  (as  evidenced  by values  of the
coefficients  of variation  of 0.54  and  0.36  respectively).  The  share  of
agriculture  in GDP (CV-  0.61)  is  also  highly  variable  across  sectors.  It
seems  that  the  share  of industry  increases  most  rapidly  at the  expense  of
the  share  of agriculture.
Average  illiteracy  rates  for  all  ages  and  for  both sexes  are
higher  in  rural  areas.  The  aggregate  gender  differential  (female  illiteracy
divided  by male illiteracy)  is lower  for  rural  (2.52)  than  for  urban  areas
(3.54).  Given the  values  of the  standard  deviations,  this  difference  appears
to  be statistically  significant.  A plausible  (demand-side)  explanation  of
this  finding  is that  agricultural  activities  are less  education-intensive
for  women  and  men. That is,  the  predominance  of a secter  with low  education
intensity  in a region  will result  in low  demand  for  education  in that
region,  but,  under  reasonable  assumptions,  in  higher  equity  across  sexes  in
investment  in  schooling.  Since  the  supply  price  of education  is  probably
lower  in urban  areas,  and  if the  lower  price  prompts  a greater  response
from  girls  than  boys,  the  ratio  between  male and female  illiteracy  rates
should  be lower  in urban  areas.  This  points  out  a weakness  of studies  that
focus  only  on shifts  in  supply  of schooling,  and  highlights  the  importance
of studying  the  determinants  of shifts  in the  schooling  demand  curve.
38Table  3
CORRELATION  BETWEEN  ENROLLMENT  RATIOS AND ILLITERACY RATES:
PERU,  1985-86
ENROLLMENT  RATIO  TOTAL  COHORT  GROUP  (IN  YEARS)
(by  school  g-oup)  15-19  20-24  25-29  30-34  35-39  40+
Initial  -. 596  -. 538  -. 552  -. 1'0  -.597  -. 616  -. 587
Primary  .694  .694  .691  .327  .691  .711  .691
Secondary  -. 815  -. 881  -. 847  -. 639  -.829  -. 851  -. 812
Postsecondary  -. 669  -.696  -. 672  -. 516  -. 682  -. 714  -. 658
University  -.402  -.444  -. 439  -. 332  -.394  -. 406  -. 412
Other  -.725  -. 663  -.689  -. 483  -. 731  -.751  -.736
Notes:  l.All  correlations  except  those  marked  by an asterisk  are  significant
at  the  5 percent  level.  All  correlations  are significant  at the 10
percent  level.  The  test  used  to determine  statistical  significance
of the  correlation  is  the  t-statistic
t  - [(n-2r)/(1-r  )]  .
n is the  number  of observations,  r is the  computed  correlation
coefficient,  and (n-2)  is the  number  of degrees  of freedom.
2.The  number  of  observations  is 23.  Lima  and  Callao,  and  Loreto  and
Ucayali  are  aggregated  to  maintain  conformity  with available  GDP
accounts.
3.Enrollment  Ratios  are  calculated  as ratios  of total  enrollment  in
the  department  to total  population.  For an idea  of  how much  age-
distributions  differ  across  department,  see  column  5 of Table  in
the  Appendix.
Sources:  For illiteracy  rates,  enrollment  and  population,  Peru:  Compendio
EstadlstLco,  1987,  Systema  Estadistico  Nacional,  Instituto  Nacional
de  Estadistica.
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HEANS  AND STANDARD  DEVIATIONS  OF VARIABLES  BY  DEPARTMENT,  1981-82
Variables  Means  and Standard  Deviations
Mean  S.D.
RHS Variables:
Per  Capita  GDP (Current  Prices)  174.46  148.65
Share  of Industry  in Dept.GDP  0.37  0.20
Share  of Agriculture  in Dept.GDP  0.23  0.14
Share  of Setvices  etc.in  Dept.GDP  0.33  0.12
Share  of Govt.  Services  in Dept.GDP  0.07  0.03
Degree  of Urbanization  55.66  21.76
Roads  per 1000  Square  Kilometers  785.06  2258.45
Post  Offices  per 1000  Sq.  Km.  2.82  1.92
Urban  Rural
Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D.
LHS Variables:
Female  illiteracy  rate:  All ages  18.67  10.84  46.22  16.76
Male illiteracy  rate:  All  ages  5.44  3.12  19.43  9.09
Female/Male  illiteracy  ratio:  All  3.54  0.87  2.52  0.51
Female  illiteracy  rate:  15-19  years  3.80  2.24  18.42  11.20
Male illiteracy  rate:  15-19  years  1.62  0.74  6.96  3.55
Female/Male  illiteracy  ratio:  15-19  2.45  0.83  2.55  0.63
Female  illiteracy  rate:  20-24  years  5.85  3.99  26.19  14.42
Male illiteracy  rate:  20-24  years  1.62  0.89  7.58  4.47
Female/Male  illiteracy  ratio:  20-24  3.81  1.47  3.93  1.44
Female  illiteracy  rate:  25-29  years  8.75  5.67  34.50  17.13
Male illiteracy  rate:  15-19  years  1.95  1.09  10.25  5.93
Female/Male  illiteracy  ratio:  25-29  4.96  2.31  3.84  1.42
Female  illiteracy  rate:  30-34  years  13.88  9.04  44.94  18.56
Male illiteracy  rate:  30-34  years  3.04  1.83  14.40  8.22
Female/Male  illiteracy  ratio:  30-34  5.01  2.30  3.72  1.77
Female  illiteracy  rate:  35-39  years  22.08  12.77  55.89  17.56
Male illiteracy  rate:  35-39  years  4.52  2.54  19.83  9.93
Female/Male  illiteracy  ratio:  35-39  5.27  2.07  3.23  1.17
Female  illiteracy  rate:  40+  years  37.72  17.76  69.69  17.04
Male illiteracy  rate:  40+  years  12.00  6.54  34.01  12.95
Female/Male  illiteracy  ratio:  40+  3.34  0.88  2.17  0.44
Notes:  Means  are  Unweighted  averages.
40When  we examlne  the  patterns  across  cohorts,  we find  a small
dlfference  for  the  younger  age  groups  (15  to 29  years)  in this  ratio  across
reglons,  and  a sLgnfiLcantly  larger  dlfference  for  people  30 years  and
older.  One lnterpretatlon  of thls  flndlng  is that  over time,  the  gender
dLfferences  ln  urban  areas  have  narrowed  more rapidly  than  in rural  areas.
AgaLn,  a demand  aide  explanation  seems  plausible.  The  rapid  growth  of
services  ln urban  areas  can  account  for  greater  equity  even if the  supply
price  of schoolLng  is  constant  over  time,  if  women  have a comparatlve
advantage  over  men in  worklng  in  services  (see  section  3) is  It is
difficult  to rule  out  a supply-side  explanation  here.  It may  be that  the
supply  price  of schoollng  has fallen  relatively  more in  urban  than in rural
areas  over  time,  and that  female  schooling  has a  higher  price  elasticity
than  male schooling,  analogous  to Gertler  and  Alderman's  (1989)  arguments
for  health.
Results  of the  Schooling  RegressLons
The general  form  of the  estimated  equations  for  females  and  males
respectively  ls
S  m 00  +  Iker-Capita-GDP  +  *2Share-of-Industry
+  i3Share-of-Serviees  +  +  Urbanization +  ef  (16a)
gm - +  PtlPr-Caplta-GDP  +  2Share-of-Industry
+  P381ere-of-ServLces  +  p.UrbanLzatLon  +  e  (16b)
Note  that  men  may  still  have  an  absolute  advantage  in both  industry
and  services.
41The  first  three  slope  coefficients  in  each  equation  measure  demand
shifts,  while  the last  coefficient  measures  supply  price  effects.  Since  S
stands  for  illiteracy  rates,  a  negative  coefficient  implies  a favorable
effect  on education  levels.  In this  section,  I refer  to the absolute
magnitudes  of the  coefficients  when  using  the  phrases  "greater  than"  or
"less  than."
Table  5 reports  the  results  of the  regressions.  The  first  two
rows  report  the  results  of the  regressions  (16a)  and  (16b).  The  results  for
the  sample  as a whole indicate  no significant  support  for  hypotheses  Hl to
H6 listed  in  section  4. The  only  significant  variable  is  urbanization,
although  the  signs  of the  other  coefficients  conform  with the  theory.
The insignificance  of results  using  a sample  of all ages is  not
surprising.  Schooling  decisions  of age  groups  35  years  and  above  were  made
two  decades  ago.  The structure  of the  department's  economy  and  hence  the
demand  for  schooling  is likely  to  have  changed  since  then.  It is  more
sensible  to look  at the  relationship  between  the  illliteracy  of younger
cohorts  and department  income,  demand  structure,  and  degree  of urbanization.
The  relationships  are likely  to  be strong  for  the  youngest  cohort  group,  and
to diminish  as the  age of the  cohort  increases.
Results  support  this  argument  :  for  all  but the  oldest  groups
(35-39  years  and  40 years  and  above)  there  is reasonably  strong  evidence
that  a rise in the  share  of the  services  sector,  holding  the  share  of
industry  constant,  raises  the  schooling  levels  of females  and  males.  As
predicted  by the theory,  the  coefficient  for  females  is (2.5  to 5 times)
42larger  in  magnitude,  and intermittently  significant  at the 10  percent  level
of significance  for  a one-tailed  test.  The  coefficient  for industry's  share
is  always  greater  in  magnitude  for  females  but  never  significant.  This
evidence,  combined  with the  fact  that  the  variance  of the  share  of industry
is in fact  larger  than that  of the  service  sector,  is evidence  consistent
with the  view that  a rise in the  share  of services  in  GDP leads  to greater
increases  in  the  e'ucation  of  women  than  an equivalent  increase  in the  share
of industry.  The coefficient  for  the  degree  of urbanization  is  always
negative  for  both females  and  males,  always  greater  in  magnitude  for
females,  and  statistically  significant  at the  5  percent  level  for  a
one-tailed  test.
Given  the  high  degree  of multicollinearity  between  the  share  of
industry  and  the  rate  of urbanization,  the  high standard  errors  of the
coefficients  are  not  surprising.  To increase  the  degrees  of freedom  (a
common  solution  for  multicollinearity),  the  female  and  male schooling
equations  are  estimated  separately  for  rural  and  urban  regions,  thus
allowing  the  omission  of the  urbanization  variable.  This is roughly
equivalent  to treating  the  urbanization  variable  as a binary  variable.  It is
a test  of the  alternative  view that,  within  a  department,  it is costless  for
an  adult  to  migrate  from  rural  to  urban  regions  (or  vice  versa),  but the
cost  of sending  a  child  for  schooling  from  rural  to  urban  regions  is  very
high.  The  estimated  equations  for  urban  areas  are
Urban  S.  - 00  +  l  Per-Capita-GDP  +  2Share-of-Industry
+  'A3Share-of-Services  +  e f  (17a)
43Urban  S  - A0+  j  IPor-Capita-GDP  +  paShare-of-Industry
+  #3 Share-of-Services +  f  (178b)
and  for rural  areas
Rural  St-  0  +0Per-Capita-GDP  +  i  Share-of-Industry #0  I  ~~~~~~~~~a
+  *3Share-of-Servicos  +  e  r(iS)
Rural  S  - p 0 +  "  Per-Capita-GDP  +  p Share-of-Industry
+  p3Share-of-ServLces  +  c  (18b)
The  results  for  urban  areas  are rows  3 and  4; for  rural  areas,
rows 5  and 6 in  Table 5.
Regressions  for  groups  aged 15-19,  20-24,  and  25-29  years  confirm
the  theory.  The  coefficients  for  the  share  of services  in  GDP are
significant  and  larger  in magnitude  for  females  than  for  males,  and  larger
in rural  than  in  urban  areas.  The coefficients  for the  share  of industry  in
GDP are  generally  insignificant  for  female  schooling,  and  generally
significant  for  urban  male schooling.  This  seems  to confirm  the  hypothesis
that  industry  rewards  schooling  more than  the  main omitted  class,
agriculture,  and  that  men  have  a comparative  advantage  in industry.  Women,
on the  other  hand,  have a comparative  advantage  in services.  The  sign  and
magnitude  of the  coefficient  for  GDP indicate  that female  schooling
increases  by more than  male schooling  when income  increases,  and  that  the
increases  are  larger  for  both females  and  males  in rural  areas.
Regressions  that  include  variables  proxylng  Z 1, roads  per square
kilometer,  telephone  lines  per  capita,  and  post  offices  per square
44kilometer,  were also  estimated.  The  coefficients  were insignificant,  and
the  coefficients  for  per  capita  GDP,  shares  of services  and industry,  and
urbanization  were left  largely  unchanged.' 9
The  major  limitation  of this  analysis  is that  the  shares  of each
sector  in  a department  may  be jointly  determined  with  education  levels  of
men and  women.  For  example,  services  may require  more  educated  women  than
educated  men, so provinces  that  have relatively  more educated  women  will
tend to  have a larger  share  of services  in  GDP.  The issue  of causality
between  share  of services  and the  demand  for  education  of  women is left
unresolved.  This is a crippling  limitation  for  purposes  of deciding  policy.
I address  this  issue  by estimating  regressions  by cohorts.
Assuming  that  the sectors'  shares  in  GDP are  relatively  stable  across
departments,  the  correlation  between  schooling  and  sectoral  share  should  be
stronger  for  younger  cohorts  if  a higher  share  of services  and industry
leads  to  a higher  demand  for  education.  On the  other  hand, if  education
intensive  activities  are  concentrated  in  areas  with  high exogenous  education
levels,  this  would  imply  uniformly  strong  correlations  between  education
levels  and structure  of the  economy  across  all  age  groups.  The regressions
discussed  above indicate  that the  correlations  are  weak for  older  cohorts,
implying  support  for  the  view that  causality  runs  from  economy  structure  to
schooling  levels,  and  not  vice  versa.
The results  in  this  section  are  similar  to those  found  in  Gill and
These  results,  which  are  not  reported  here,  are  available  from  the
author.
45Khandker  (1990)  for  a sample  of about  100  countries  in 1965  and 1987.
Migration  is likely  to be more frequent  within  a country  than  across
national  boundaries.  The  similarity  of results  by country  and  by province
implies  that  the  possibility  of cross-department  migration  does  not  seem to
be a significant  factor  in  schooling  decisions.  This issue  needs  more
examination,  though,  before  any  conclusive  statement  can  be made on the
effects  of migration  on the  rates  of return  to human  capital.
46Table  5
CROSS-SECTION  SCHOOLING  REGRESSIONS:  PERU,  1985-86
Dependent  Independent  Variables
Variable  CONSTANT PER  CAP.  INDUSTRY SERVICES DEGREE  OF  UNADJ.
GDP  SHARE  SHARE  URBANIZN. R-SQR.
All  Ages
l.Female  Total  73.713  -0.019  9.196  -13.378  -0.647  .817
Illiteracy  Rate  (0.02)  (17.61)  (31.28)  (0.15)
2.Male  Total  33.479  -0.013  -0.584  -13.979  -0.239  .714
Illiteracy  Rate  (0.01)  (10.42)  (18.49)  (0.09)
3.Female  Urban  50.189  -0.040  -8.892  -60.113  .545
Illiteracy  Rate  (0.02)  (13.72)  (17.42)
4.Male  Urban  15.010  -0.012  -4.410  -16.739  .587
Illiteracy  Rate  (0.00)  (3.76)  (4.77)
5.Female  Rural  86.408  -0.049  -3.506  -80.723  .354
Illiteracy  Rate  (0.03)  (25.73)  (32.67)
6.Nale  Rural  42.407  -0.030  -4.380  -44.040  .362
Illiteracy  Rate  (0.02)  (14.61)  (18.56)
Note:  Sample  consists  of 23 departments  in Peru
Significant  at 10  percent,  at 5 percent  level,  at 1 percent  level.
Standard  errors  in  parentheses.
47Table  V (Continued)
CROSS-SECTION  SCHOOLING  REGRESSIONS:  PERU,  1985-86
Dependent  Independent  Varlables
Variable  CONSTANT PER  CAP.  INDUSTRY SERVICES DEGREE  OF  UNADJ.
GDP  SHARE  SHARE  URBANIZN.  R-SQR.
Population  Aged 15-19  Years
l.Female  Total  38.562  -0.012  -7.420  -26.313  -0.237  .774
Illiteracy  Rate  (0.01)  (10.10)  (17.94)  (0.09)
2.Male  Total  11.364  -0.004  .0.618  -5.171  -0.083  .658
Illiteracy  Rate  (0.01)  (4.04)  (7.18)  (0.03)
3.Female  Urban  10.945  -0.009  -2.472  -13.242  .623
Illiteracy  Rate  (0.00)  (2.65)  (3.36)
4.Male  Urban  3.687  -0.002  -0.947  -3.786  .280
Illiteracy  Rate  (0.00)  (1.42)  (1.80)
5.Female  Rural  54.960  -0.040  -14.039  -69.955  .524
Illiteracy  Rate  (0.02)  (15.80)  (20.06)
6.Male  Rural  15.962  -0.015  0.583  -18.415  .396
Illiteracy  Rate  (0.01)  (6.02)  (7.64)
Population  Aged 20-24  Years
l.Female  Total  55.657  -0.013  -13.596  -37.260  -0.237  .816
Illiteracy  Rate  (0.01)  (12.65)  (22.46)  (0.11)
2.Male  Total  14.941  -0.006  -2.693  -11.878  -0.073  .691
Illiteracy  Rate  (0.01)  (4.54)  (8.07)  (0.04)
3.Female  Urban  20.624  -0.012  -9.157  -27.038  .655
Illiteracy  Rate  (0.01)  (4.52)  (5.74)
4.Male  Urban  4.951  -0.002  -2.873  -5.568  .576
Illiteracy  Rate  (0.00)  (1.14)  (1.45)
5.Female  Rural  72.187  -0.048  -19.606  -86.341  .511
Illiteracy  Rate  (0.02)  (19.98)  (25.36)
6.Male  Rural  18.686  -0.019  0.037  -21.900  .387
Illiteracy  Rate  (0.01)  (7.58)  (9.63)
Note:  Sample  consists  of 23 depertments  in  Peru
Significant  at 10  percent,  at 5 percent  level,  at 1 percent  level.
Standard  errors  in  parentheses.
48T'olo  V  (Continued)
CROSS-SECTION  SCROOLING  REOR8SSIONS:  PERU,  1985-06
Dependent  Independent  Varlab  a_
Variable  CONSTANT PER CAP.  INDUSTRY SERVICES  DEGREE  OF  UNADJ.
GDP  SHARE  SHARE  URBANIZN.  R-SQR.
Population  Aged 25-29  Years
l.Female  Total  65.174  -0.017  -7.644  -29.348  -0.488  .825
Illiteracy  Rate  (0.02)  (15.14)  (26.88)  (0.13)
2.Male  Total  19.725  .0.010*  .2.674  .15.610* -0.096*  .718
Illiteracy  Rate  (0.01)  (5.77)  (10.24)  (0.05)
3.Feaale  Urban  26.485  -0.021  -7.588  -32.347  .585
Illlteracy  Rate  (0.01)  (6.93)  (8.79)
4.Male  Urban  6.026  -0.004  -2.351  -7.235  .734
Illiteracy  Rate  (0.00)  (1.08)  (1.37)
5.Female  Rural  85.822  -0.056  -18.634  -97.214  .483
Illiteracy  Rate  (0.03)  (23.83)  (30.26)
6.Male  Rural  25.492  -0.027  0.314  -29.957  .452
Illiteracy  Rate  (0.01)  (9.25)  (11.74)
Population  Aged  30-34  Years
l.Fetale  Total  84.684  -0.021  -18.090  -62.375  -0.451  .724
Illiteracy  Rate  (0.03)  (22.99)  (40.83)  (0.20)
2.Male  Total  28.882  -0.011  -6.516  -20.340  -0.156  .738
Illiteracy  Rate  (0.01)  (8.03)  (14.26)  (0.07)
3.Female  Urban  40.319  -0.031  -10.513  -48.771  .509
Illiteracy  Rate  (0.01)  (12.05)  (15.30)
4.Male  Urban  10.001  -0.005  -5.422  -11.570  .738
Illiteracy  Rate  (0.00)  (1.78)  (2.25)
5.Female  Rural  93.902  -0.059  -11.044  -94.348  .397
Illiteracy  Rate  (0.03)  (27.84)  (35.35)
6.Male  Rural  37.853  -0.033  -6.396  -43.207 .470
Illiteracy  Rate  (0.01)  (12.29)  (15.60)
Note:  Sample  consists  of  23  departments  in  Peru
Signifieant  at  10 percent,  at  5 percent  level,  at  1  percent  level.
Standard  errors  in  parentheses.
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CROSS-SECTION  SCHOOLING  REGRESSIONS:  PERU,  1985-86
Dependent  Independent  Variables
Variable  CONSTANT PER CAP.  INDUSTRY SERVICES DEGREE  OF  UNADJ.
GDP  SHARE  SHARE  URBANIZN. R-SQR.
Population  Aged  35-39  Years
l.Female  Total  81.797  -0.015  17.634  4.990  -0.845  .855
Illiteracy  Rate  (0.02)  (17.97)  (31.91)  (0.15)
2.Male  Total  36.829  -0.012  -,5.359  -19.729  -0.235  744
Illiteracy  Rate  (0.01)  (10.29)  (18.28)  (0.09)
3.Female  Urban  55.197  -0.046  -8.302  -61.856  .463
Illiteracy  Rate  (0.02)  (17.42)  (22.11)
4.Male  Urban  12.569  -0.010  -4.472  -13.281  .667
Illiteracy  Rate  (0.00)  (2.71)  (3.44)
5.Female  Rural  94.333  -0.057  1.534  -74.458  .294
Illiteracy  Rate  (0.03)  (29.64)  (37.63)
6.Male  Rural  47.133  -0.038  -7.004  -49.919  .416
Illiteracy  Rate  (0.02)  (15.87)  (20.15)
Population  Aged 40 & More Years
l.Female  Total  87.159  -0.018  41.269  18.442  -0.885  .792
Illiteracy  Rate  (0.02)  (21.93)  (38.94)  (0.19)
2.Male  Total  51.328  -0.017  8.004  -5.877  -0.442  .698
Illiteracy  Rate  (0.02)  (16.89)  (30.00)  (0.15)
3.Female  Urban  80.244  -0.068  2.073  -86.466  .487
Illiteracy  Rate  (0.03)  (23.09)  (29.32)
4.Male  Urban  27.812  -0.025  -4.198  -27.254  .459
Illiteracy  Rate  (0.01)  (8.87)  (11.27)
5.Female  Rural  94.272  -0.056  26.476  -56.789  .265
Illiteracy  Rate  (0.03)  (30.11)  (38.23)
6.Male  Rural  62.652  -0.044  -0.332  -54.795  .308
Illiteracy  Rate  (0.02)  (21.75)  (27.61)
Note:  Sample  consists  of 23 departments  in Peru
Significant  at 10  percent,  at 5 percent  level,  at 1 percent  level.
Standard  errors  in parentheses.
506. CONCLUSIONS  AND POLICY  IMPLICATIONS
The  main question  addressed  in this  paper  is:  Do parents  consider
future  labor  activities  when  making  schooling  decisions  for  their  childrel?
To the  extent  that  current  demand  for  labor  and remuneration  reflect
economic  patteras  in the  future,  the  answer  seems  to be that  they  do.
The  main new  policy  implication  that  emerges  from  this  paper  and
from  Gill  and  Khandker  (1990)  is  that the  expansion  of the  service  sector
raises  the  levels  of schooling  of both  men  and  women,  but  has a larger
effect  on women.  That is,  both increased  human  capital  and  equity  between
the  sexes  are associated  with an increase  in the  service  sector's  share  in
CDP,  at the  expense  of agriculture.  This is  probably  an intermediate  stage.
As this  structural  transformation  continues,  the  share  of the  industrial
sector  begins  to  play the  role  that  services  played  at the  earlier  stage.
This is in marked  contrast  to policy  that  emerges  from  well-known
theories  of economic  growth,  including  Rostow  (1960),  Rosenstein-Rodan
(1961),  and others.  It  has been  argued  that  in the  process  of growth,
agriculture  is the  primary  stage,  industry  the  secondary  stage,  and  services
the  tertiary  stage.  But  two  points  should  be kept  in mind.  First,  the
policies  recommended  here are  not aimed  at economic  growth  per  se,  but
economlc  growth  with  Increases  in  equity  across  gender.  Second,  the  nature
of the  services  sector  is very  different  in low-income  countries.
This policy  also  contradicts  the  World  Bank's  advice  that
developing  countries  need to increase  the  production  of tradables.  But at
least  as far  as  gender  equity  in earnings  potential  is  concerned,  it  would
51be  better  to  encourage  the  expansion  of  sectors  produclng  nontradablos.
Another  implication  of the  findings  ln  this  paper  is that  extending
schooling  facilities  slgnificantly  raises  investment  in  schooling,  and
lowers  the  gender  gap  as  well.  The  third  implication  is  that  lnformation
about  the  rates  of  return  tt  schooling  in  home  activities  wll raise  the
scaicoling  levels  of females  by more than  those  of  sales.
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54APPENDIX  I:  RESULTS  OF HOUSEHOLD  EXPENDITURE  REGRESSIONS,  1985-86
Independent  Equation  1  Equation  2
Variables
Constant  86.043  -179.871
(184.04)  (223.50)
Age of Household  Head  27.226  24.423
(8.25)  (13.28)
Age  of Household  Head  -0.325  -0.276
(0.09)  (0.15)
Schooling  of Household  Head  -8.889  -29.887
(11.663  (14.13)
Schooling2  of Household  Head  5.459  4.941
(0.70)  (0.82)
Training  of Household  Head  75.001  61.105
(33.51)  (36.97)
Did  Household  Head  Attend  -16.308  35.729
Public  School  ?  (36.20)  (41.78)
Age  of Spouse  10.090
(11.69)
Age  of Spouse  -0.141
(0.14)
Schooling  of Spouse  47.378
(15.14)
Schooling2  of Spouse  0.351
(0.97)
Training  of Spouse  108.219
(38.99)
Did Spouse  Attend  -113.510
Public  School?  (41.23)
Unearned  Income  0.008  0.006
(0.00)  (0.00)
Rural  Dummy  -153.257  -44.299
(30.07)  (35.87)
Adjusted  R2 0.192  0.244
Sample  Size  4377  3325
Note:  Dependent  variable  is  total  household  expenditure  per adult
Significant  at 10  percent,  at 5 percent,  at 1  percent  level.
Standard  errors  in  parentheses.
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